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Abstract—Given increasing risk from climate-induced natural
hazards, there is growing interest in the development of methods
that can quantitatively measure resilience in power systems. This
work quantifies resilience in electric power transmission networks
in a new and comprehensive way that can represent the multiple
processes of resilience. A novel aspect of this approach is the
use of empirical data to develop the probability distributions
that drive the model. This paper demonstrates the approach
by measuring the impact of one potential improvement to a
power system. Specifically, we measure the impact of additional
distributed generation on power system resilience.
Index Terms—resilience, empirical data, blackout, risk
I. INTRODUCTION
While there is ongoing debate about exactly how to define
resilience in electric power systems, within the field of ecol-
ogy, resilience is well defined. According to [1], “resilience is
the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize
while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the
same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks.” In order to
understand how resilient a system is, therefore, we need to
understand both the susceptibility of that system to failures,
and the ability of that system to recover from failures. In
this paper we propose a method for quantitatively measuring
resilience in electric power systems based on modeling (using
empirical data) five key processes:
1) Stress leads to component outages or failures
2) Cascading failures propagate within the network, caus-
ing additional outages
3) Services are interrupted (load is shed)
4) Restoration of failed components and unserved load
5) Quantification of blackout impacts
All large resilience events involve these five processes to some
extent. For example, in the August 14, 2003 blackout: (1)
lines sagged into trees, (2) outaged lines triggered a cascade of
failures, (3) around 50 million people were left without power,
(4) power was incrementally restored over a period of hours
to days, (5) estimates of direct blackout cost ranged from 4 to
12 billion dollars.
The most effective analyses of a particular resilience event,
such as a blackout, measure the event’s impact or social cost
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Fig. 1. Visualizing the relative contribution to resilience risk from blackouts
of different sizes and durations. The area of each rectangle is proportional
to the blackout risk in each category. This figure separates blackouts along
two dimensions: blackout size (load lost, customers unserved) and blackout
duration. Size and duration inversely correlate with probability: Small (or
short) blackout are relatively frequent and large (or long) blackouts are rare.
Because risk is the product of probability and impact, the risk from blackouts
of different sizes is frequently similar.
in a number of dimensions. Two of the most important dimen-
sions for understanding resilience are the size of the blackout
(usually the initial extent in customers or power shed) and
the amount of time required to restore the load (the duration).
Some events, like the European blackout of Nov. 4, 2006 have
enormous impact in geographic size (15 million customers),
but are relatively short in duration (hours). Other events have
smaller geographic size (e.g., the impact of Hurricane Irma
on Puerto Rico), but the restoration process takes a very long
time (almost 1 year until complete restoration). In order to
understand resilience, we need to be able to quantify the risk
that comes from events in each of these dimensions, since it
is likely that different strategies are needed to deal with these
different types of risks. Figure 1 provides one way to think
about these two different dimensions.
Due to the critical importance of designing civil infras-
tructure to withstand extreme events, there is substantial
research on infrastructure resilience in the civil engineering
literature. Several have studied the impact of weather events on
power systems infrastructure [2]–[4]. Others have developed
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sophisticated models of interdependence among infrastructure
systems [5]–[7]. However, there is often a need for additional
power systems detail in order to fully understand resilience in
electric energy systems.
In power systems there is long history of valuable research
into many elements of the resilience problem. Many have
studied the risk of exogenous events, such as storms [8] on
the failure of power systems components. Others study the
impact of multiple contingencies on power systems (e.g., [9]–
[12]). There is a growing body of literature regarding the
processes and risk associated with how initiating outages
trigger cascading failures and thus large blackouts [13]–
[15]. Power system restoration has been an important topic
for years [16]. Motivated at least in part by recent severe
resilience events, such as Superstorm Sandy [17], Hurricane
Katrina [18], and the Chilean earthquake of 2010 [19], many
have proposed new methods for improving power systems
restoration processes for transmission networks [20] and for
distribution networks [21].
Initial efforts within the power systems community have
developed metrics for measuring resilience of the power
grid [22]. A few have combined many of the five processes
and initial work on the remaining processes into a frame-
work to measure the resilience [23]–[25]. Others [23] used
structural analysis techniques to provide the fragility curve for
transmission towers and measure the effect of time and space
variation in stress from natural hazards. Ref. [24] used optimal
restoration in combination with system hardening to optimize
the components to harden. Nan et al. [25] systematically incor-
porated the components of resilience into one metric, which
was combined with performance measures, and this paper also
included in the implementation steps an approach to model
interactions between critical infrastructures. Methods to model
the effects of multiple hazards together have been explored and
results compared with distribution network outage data in [26].
But in our estimation there are two key gaps in the existing
literature. First, there is a need for additional work that
models the resilience problem as a whole, providing methods
for quantitatively (and tractably) modeling each of the five
processes: Stress, Cascading, Failure, Recovery, and Analysis.
Including all five resilience processes is critical for addressing
important policy questions, such as ‘what types of resources
or investments provide the most resilience value?’
Second, there is a need for resilience-modeling methods that
are driven by real data. Obtaining sufficiently detailed utility
data is difficult, but some real data is becoming available
and is even publicly available [27]. Real-world statistical
data describing the processes of resilience offer a strong
opportunity to form a comprehensive resilience model that is
directly driven by this data, which can mitigate many of the
challenges associated with the tricky modeling assumptions
that are required when real data are not available. This paper
describes and demonstrates a platform or framework for doing
just this: using real-world data from bulk power systems to
comprehensively and quantitatively model all the processes of
resilience.
In this work, we aim to evaluate resilience comprehensively
and simply by approximating the multiple processes of re-
silience with probability distributions driven by real data. We
call this data-driven approach CRISP, standing for Computing
Resilience Interactions Simulation Platform. To illustrate the
use of CRISP, we demonstrate how it can be used to address
the significant policy question of quantitatively assessing the
extent to which distributed generation can enhance resilience
in a power system test case.
II. OVERVIEW OF CRISP MODEL
This section provides a high-level overview of how the
CRISP model proceeds through the five resilience processes.
One thing to note is that this implementation of CRISP
assumes that the resilience processes do not overlap. That is,
we make the reasonable idealization that the five processes of
resilience occur separately and in sequence.
A. Outages after cascading
In this implementation of CRISP we use real data to model
the first two processes of resilience (Stress and Cascading).
Specifically, we use historical data to estimate the distribution
of the number of outages that occur in close temporal proxim-
ity, given that one or more transmission outages occur. Here
we use the term “cascade” to refer to a group of line outages
in close temporal proximity [28].
The annual rate of cascades of outages occurring is c. Given
that a cascade of outages has occurred, the total number of
components outaged after cascading NL includes the initial
outages as well as the outages that result from any cascade
propagation that occurs after the initial outages. Due to the
different time scales of cascading and restoration, this assump-
tion should make a minor impact on the measured impact of
the blackout. The total number of line outages NL is modeled
as a Zipf distribution with parameter s:
NL ∼ Zipf(s)
P [NL = nL] =
1
ζ(s)
1
nsL
, nL = 1, 2, 3, ... (1)
The parameter s > 0 controls the slope of the Zipf distribution
on a log-log plot. A smaller s gives a more frequent large
number of outages and corresponds to a transmission system
with more stress, such as worse weather or peak loading.
Given the number of lines outaged, the individual lines that
go out are chosen randomly. Future versions of the model will
adjust the relative outage rates from historical outage data and
network structure.
Note that we do not describe the evolution in time or the
details of the component stress or outages or cascading, we
simply rely on observed data for the statistics of the outcome
of these processes. This substantially reduces the number of
modeling assumptions we need to make in our quantification
of resilience.
B. Blackout
Given the individual line and generator outages, we need
to evaluate which loads are shed as a result. This is done by
running an optimal power flow called LS-OPF that allows load
shedding for the grid that remains intact. In particular, the load
shed is minimized subject to the DC load flow equations, line
flow limits, generation limits, and load limits. The total load
shed is denoted as L0.
C. Restoration
Given the lines and generators that are out of service at
the end of the outage process, CRISP next models the time
Rk after the end of the outage process at which component k
is restored. The component restore times Rk are independent
samples from the distribution
Rk ∼ LogNormal(µ, σ2)
fR(r) =
1
r
√
2pi σ
exp
[−(ln r − µ)2
2σ2
]
, r > 0 (2)
The restoration process is evaluated at discrete times t1, t2,
..., tn after the end of the outages. The restoration process
starts at time t0 with the lines and generators that are outaged
at the end of the outage process. At each time tk, the com-
ponents restored in the time interval [tk−1, tk] are determined
from their individual restoration times. Then the LS-OPF is
run to evaluate which loads are shed at time tk. The total load
not served at time tk is denoted by Lk. The restoration process
continues until all outaged components are restored.
D. Blackout impact
Next, we quantify the blackout size by the energy unserved
S, which is obtained from the load shed during the restoration
process as
S =
n∑
k=1
(tk − tk−1)Lk−1 (3)
Since the CRISP model is generated stochastically by sam-
pling from probability distributions, each pass through the
model gives a sample outcome, and many such samples
are accumulated to give an empirical distribution of energy
unserved S. Each sample of S is the energy unserved in one
cascade of outages. If the annual expected energy unserved
over a time period is desired, then this is the mean of the
distribution of S multiplied by the annual cascade rate c.
EENS = cE[S] (4)
III. UTILITY DATA DRIVING THE CRISP MODEL
To illustrate the CRISP modeling, we use statistical data
from published detailed outage data of a large transmission
grid in the Northwest USA from 1999 to 2012 [29]. This
detailed historical outage data has been processed for other
uses in previous work [28], [30], [31].
North American utilities and many utilities world-wide
routinely collect similar data, and it is intended that CRISP
modeling would be applied in practice with each utility’s own
detailed outage data that they have already collected together
with the DC load flow model of that utility’s transmission grid.
It is convenient (but not essential to the approach) to fit the
empirical probability distributions from the data with standard
distributions that are then sampled to drive the CRISP model,
instead of directly sampling from the empirical distributions
themselves.
A. Number of lines outaged after a cascade
We need the distribution of the total number of transmission
lines outaged at the end of a cascade (that is, both the initial
and subsequent cascading outages). We use the automatic line
outages in the data that are grouped into cascades if they occur
sufficiently close in time using the simple processing of [28].
To ensure that the statistics reflect successful protection actions
as well as the rarer events involving a succession of multiple
outages, the cascades are defined to also include single or only
a few outages that do not propagate further.
The empirical distribution of the number of line outages in
a cascade is shown in Fig. 2. This empirical distribution is
fit with the Zipf distribution (1) shown in Fig. 2 using the
formula in [32], which gives the Zipf parameter s = 2.56.
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Fig. 2. Probability distribution of the number of lines outaged in a cascade
on log-log plot showing empirical distribution from utility data and fit with
Zipf distribution.
B. Transmission line restoration time
The empirical distribution of the transmission line restora-
tion time is obtained directly from the utility data [29] and
fit with the lognormal distribution (2) as in [31]. The fitted
lognormal parameters are µ = 3.66 and σ = 2.43.
C. Power system case data
We edited the 39 bus case in MATPOWER to be n − 1
secure, by adding redundant lines and increasing line limits
where necessary. As an experiment we added distributed
generation to the load buses in the original and n− 1 secure
39 bus case to show the positive effect of well managed
distributed resources on network resilience.
IV. CRISP IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
This section describes the modeling and implementation
details we are using for this work, but which could be done
differently depending on what questions motivate the analysis.
A. Data driven approach to line outages
The number of lines that outage and their restoration times
are sampled from their respective distributions (1) and (2),
using standard inverse transform sampling that samples from
a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 and then applies the
inverse function of the CDF. For this initial work, the particular
lines outaged are chosen randomly.
B. Find initial load shed
Step 2 finds the initial load shed that is necessary to stabilize
the system directly after the outages found in step 1 occur. The
formulation of the load shedding OPF (LS-OPF) problem is
as follows:
max
∑
∆Pd (5)
s.t. B∆θ = ∆Pg −∆Pd (6)
− Pft ≤ Pft[0] + 1
Xft
∆θft ≤ Pft (7)
∆Pg ≤ ∆Pg ≤ ∆Pg (8)
∆Pd ≤ ∆Pd ≤ ∆Pd (9)
where ∆Pd is the total load shed and is negative, B is the
susceptance matrix, ∆θ is the change in voltage angles at each
bus, ∆Pg is the change in generation at each bus, Pft is the
maximum power flow over the line from bus f to bus t, Pft[0]
is the initial power flow over the line, Xft is the reactance
of the line between bus f and bus t, ∆θft is the change in
the difference between the voltage angles at bus f and bus t,
∆Pg is the maximum possible decrease in generation, ∆Pg
is the maximum possible increase in generation, ∆Pd is the
maximum decrease in demand, which should be the negative
of the amount of demand, and ∆Pd is the maximum increase
in demand, which initially will be 0.
If the outages create islands in the system, we first find each
island and we solve for the unserved load separately and find
the sum.
C. Data driven approach to restoration process
The model of the restoration process loops through the
repair times of each line in temporal order, and at each repair
time, tk, finds the optimal load shed, L(tk). We use a similar
optimal power flow to the LS-OPF with updated bounds on
the variables ∆Pd and ∆Pg depending on the current state of
Pd and Pg . We do not allow line switching in the optimization.
D. Compute energy unserved
We integrate the unserved load to measure the area formed
by the horizontal line of 100% load and the load served
curves in the top plots of figures 3 and 4. This area is the
energy not served, ENS, for this event.
This implementation of the CRISP model will be made pub-
licly available at https://github.com/phines/infrastructure-risk/
MEPS. Figure 3 shows the result of a two line event on the 6
bus MATPOWER test case at 0 hours in terms of the percent
of load served and the number of lines out over time for the
Fig. 3. Two line event on the 6 bus test case where some initial load shed is
necessary, and full service is restored after one line is restored.
Fig. 4. 35 line event on the 39 bus test case on top is the percent of load
served and on the bottom is the number of lines out over time.
full restoration process. Fig. 4 shows the percent of load served
and the number of lines out over time for an extreme 35 line
event on the original 39 bus MATPOWER test case.
Since our model is stochastic, and the effect of one event
on a network is not a good measure of its resilience, we
simulate 10000 events to find the distribution of outcomes.
CRISP measures the energy not served (ENS) of each blackout
in units of MWh. Note that many of the initiating outages lead
to 0 MWh of unserved energy.
V. 39-BUS SYSTEM RESULTS FROM CRISP
In order to demonstrate CRISP, we applied the model to the
IEEE 39 bus test case. In order to find the distribution of ENS,
we measured ENS over 10,000 model runs, and then compared
six different variants of the test case designed to address two
important questions. First, how does resilience change as more
distributed generation (DG) is added to the test case? Second,
what is resilience impact of adjusting the test case to make it
n− 1 secure?
In order to address the first question (DG), we added new
distributed generators at each load bus with capacity equal
to 5%, and 20% of the base case load, and then computed
the ENS distribution. In order to address the second question,
we modified the 39 bus case to be n− 1 secure by adding 8
Fig. 5. Complementary cumulative distribution of energy not served, assum-
ing an outage, from 10,000 samples of CRISP simulation on the 39 bus test
case. Percent of load that is distributed generation is varied for the original 39
bus system and for the system upgraded to be n− 1 secure. The probability
of no load shed for the original cases is approximately 75% (blue), 87% (red),
and 94% (yellow), and for the and n− 1 cases is approximately 91 % (blue
dashed), 94 % (red dashed), and 97 % (yellow dashed).
Fig. 6. Each bar shows average energy unserved per event separated into
4 categories based on the recovery time to 99.9% of the load served and
the initial load shed for 39 bus test case. Percent of load that is distributed
generation is varied for the original 39 bus system and for the system upgraded
to be n− 1 secure.
redundant parallel lines, and increasing line power flow ratings
where necessary. The results from 10,000 runs on each of the
resulting six cases are shown in Fig. 5.
Figure 5 clearly shows that the added dispatchable DG
substantially increases the resilience of the network. The DG
leads to a particularly large reduction in risk from small events
for the original 39 bus case, bringing the number of events with
0 ENS from 75% to 87% with only 5% DG and even further
to 94% with 20% DG. The DG had a similar effect on the
n − 1 secure version of the 39 bus case, however the added
5% DG has a less pronounced impact on risk, relative to the
impact of 5% DG on the original case. n− 1 security already
substantially reducing the number of small blackouts.
Fig. 7. The relative risk, shown as relative area, of four categories of events
based on the recovery time to 99.9% of the load served and the initial load
shed. Percent of load that is distributed generation is varied for the original
39 bus system and for the system upgraded to be n − 1 secure. The colors
also correspond with figure 6.
In Figs. 6 and 7 we separate the events into 4 categories to
separately analyze the risk of events that have different sizes
and durations. A measure of the relative risk of the events
within the categories is:
r =
1
n
∑
i∈Ek
ENSi (10)
where r is the relative risk of the category, n is the total
number of events, and Ek is set of events within category
k. This is shown in the stacked bar chart in figure 6 and
represented in the area shown in figure 7. The 4 categories
separate the small and large events and the short and long
events (see Fig. 1). Blackouts that are 100 MW and smaller are
considered small and the rest are considered large. Blackouts
that are 1 day or shorter are considered considered short and
the rest are considered long. An interesting observation from
these figures is that the n− 1 secure 39 case with no DG has
a similar level of total risk to the 39 bus case (original) with
5% DG on the load buses. However, the long duration and
large size events have a larger contribution to risk, relative to
the short and large events in the n − 1 case and are closer
to equal in the 39 bus case with 5% DG. This is presumably
related to the fact that the longest recovery time picked from
the distribution will always be longer than the recovery time
to 99.9% of the load served for the n − 1 case. Note that
CRISP assumes the DG is consistently available, which would
represent the case of an extremely well-managed DG fleet with
a reliable fuel supply.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a new model for measuring power
system resilience, known as CRISP (Computing Resilience In-
teractions Simulation Platform), which is driven by empirical
utility data. The main idea is to represent all the processes of
resilience in an integrated way by leveraging both the observed
statistics of utility outages and restoration and a (admittedly
simple) power grid model. While the individual outage and
restoration processes of resilience are not represented in
tremendous detail, the observed statistics driving the model do
incorporate the effect of the many and detailed mechanisms
that contribute to the processes of resilience in the observed
statistics. This approach, while approximate, largely avoids
the detailed modeling assumptions that limit the strength of
conclusions in more detailed simulations. Detailed simulations
typically select and sharply approximate a subset of the
possible mechanisms of resilience to maintain tractability. We
see our comprehensive and high-level resilience simulation as
complementary to more detailed simulations, both in assump-
tions and their application.
We demonstrate the CRISP model with real data from one
utility, but the data is standard and the model is designed
so that utilities can easily use their own data to quantify the
resilience of their own system. The paper also illustrates how
this model can be used to address important policy questions.
In this case we asked and answered the question of whether
adding well-managed distributed generation improves the re-
silience of a power system. We found that DG significantly
improves the resilience of the power system test case we
studied. Through testing the original network and the n − 1
secure network, we found that the first improvement made to
the network, whether that be added DG or making the network
n− 1 secure, appears to have the largest effect on improving
resilience.
Future improvements to this model will include better
models of cascading (spreading) based on empirical data,
time-domain changes in load levels, and some modeling of
interactions between different types of infrastructure systems.
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